The Crisis of Nationalism
Starting by giving examples of the American Revolution and the French revolution, the author rightly conveys his point that they were nationalists in essence. After the 30 years of war in Europe, the Westphalia Treaty was signed which resulted in the emergence of nation-states in the Western hemisphere. It totally abolished the role of religion in state affairs. Secularism and nationalism were the by-products of this system and each nation got its own territorial sovereignty. The church could no longer play any part in state affairs as it had been doing for so long.
Then Author writes about the Muslim states while using the word ' Muslim imperial states', as the Ottoman Empire is usually considered by many historians as an imperial state. He claims that many Muslim activists and thinkers in the nineteenth-century started rejecting the decaying memories of their 'imperial past' and they attracted to the enlightenment era and new political theories. Especially, he cites the Turkish nationalist movement and Arab nationalism, which totally rejected the concept of pan-Islamism or ummah.
When the author turns towards the Muslims of the subcontinent, he uses the word 'Muslim nationalism' in the subcontinent which is pretty much the truth. The reason is the Muslims of the subcontinent didn't consider themselves the same as other nations like Arabs who had their own lands for centuries where the ground was fertile for nationalism based on geography and culture. On the contrary, Muslims in the subcontinent had a sole identity which was Islam. They had no specific region, their culture was mixed with Hindus, and they comprised of people from different origins mainly from Central Asia and the Middle East, whereas many were Muslim converts living there for centuries. So the differences in origins made them quite distinguishable but they considered themselves Muslims. They had no impressive geographical and cultural history.
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| Pakistan Movement |
He also makes a correct case when he describes the situation of Muslim countries who, after the second world war, based their identity on nationalism while rejecting Islamism. Their economies started to collapse and from within some pan-Islamic movements emerged as a result; some of which later on turned violent.
The author contradicts himself when commenting on the new generation of Pakistanis and other Muslim states. The problem lies in these
words. 'For
example, the new generation of Turks, Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians, Pakistanis,
etc, are now completely disconnected from the original notions of their
countries’ nationhood and nationalist identities'. In
the same article, some lines above, he previously describes the Muslim nationalist movement which means the will of Muslims of the subcontinent to
freed themselves as Muslims and not as Indians or Afghans. But then he put Pakistan with the countries
who gained freedom by Nationalist movements based on ethnicity, culture, and
geography. So logically speaking, as Muslims of the Subcontinent unchained themselves from slavery
as Muslims, it means that they were not bounded by the modern nationalism concept. Also, many of them believed in
the universalism of Islam otherwise they would not have started Khilafat
Movement; they would not help Arabs in the six-day war against Israel; they
would not help Syria against Israel in 1973; they would not help Bosnians,
Afghans, Palestinians and other suppressed Muslims around the globe.
Intentionally or unintentionally author makes this mistake, leaving his real
purpose in ambiguity.
